Is blue the new green? Wave power could revolutionize the renewable-energy game
Salon, 27 August 2016, by Diane Stopyra
http://www.salon.com/2016/08/27/is-blue-the-new-green-wave-power-could-revolutionize-the-renewable-energy-game/
This article discusses progress in wave power: technology to capture the energy in ocean waves, turning waves into a renewable energy source just like solar and wind power. And there has been progress. The U.S. Department of Energy has just announced a $40 million grant to develop an open-water wave energy test facility (the first in the U.S.), and new wave-energy systems in Hawaii and Australia have been generating energy and making headlines. The energy potential of waves is vast; the article says that waves along the U.S. coast could power 200 million homes (a DoE estimate), and the world's oceans could supply more energy than total human energy requirements (an IPCC estimate). Although it also cites some prominent setbacks – the closure of Pelamis, the first commercial wind farm, after only two months of operation, for example – it nevertheless says "we could be on the cusp of a tidal change", and encourages the reader to "imagine no need for coal, fossil fuels, nuclear generators, solar arrays or wind turbines" because wave power could supply all of our energy.
My take: This is complicated, so I will write a bit more than usual. First of all, I am in favor of research on wave power. $40 million is a drop in the bucket to research what might turn out to be an important technology. My preferred overall energy policy, staring into the teeth of climate change, is "Forward in all directions!" (the slogan of 3 Mustaphas 3). In other words, research every promising technology, from wave power to nuclear, fusion to CCS (carbon capture and sequestration). That said, I am deeply skeptical that wave energy will ever be more than a tiny contributor. It might seem straightforward – just a simple mechanical engineering problem! – but our attempts at it have failed for more than a hundred years. As the article notes, seawater is highly corrosive, and has a way of destroying moving parts quite rapidly. It is also quite difficult to build something designed to absorb wave energy, but that is robust enough not to be destroyed by big storms; big waves contain a truly staggering amount of energy, all directed toward mangling the wave-power device that stands in their way. The simple, sad fact is that the new crop of wave power experiments will probably fail, just as all previous experiments have. It's a lovely idea, but there are good reasons it has never been commercially successful.
I would also note that the potential energy stats quoted by the article are misleading. The DoE estimate quoted is a theoretical maximum potential (if every bit of every wave's energy were captured); the same DoE document gives a technical maximum potential (how much we think we could ever conceivably capture) that is less than half as large. Similarly, the IPCC estimate quoted includes all wave energy across the whole ocean; but they make clear that the energy available near coastlines, where it would actually be practical and economical to harvest it, is much lower and is quite unevenly distributed around the world (see the map on page 88 of the referenced IPCC report). This means that while some coastal areas (the Pacific coast of the U.S., for example) look fairly good for wave power, other areas (the Atlantic coast, for example) are much less promising. And of course to get the power from where it is generated offshore to all of the homes that it is supposed to power would require electrical grid capacity and technology well beyond what we have today, and would entail very large long-distance transmission losses. These are non-trivial problems.
The other problem, which the article doesn't touch on at all, is the environmental impact of wave power. Imagine what our coastlines would look like if we actually built wave-power generators all along them, encircling all of the continents. What would that do to marine life – to whales, to fish, to dolphins? What would it do to human activities that depend on the oceans, from fishing to shipping to sailing? What would it do to sediment transport, to beaches, to water clarity? What would it do to nutrient cycling in the ocean, which is driven by waves, and what effect would that then have on marine biological productivity? We don't have enough information right now to know, but it seems safe to guess that the impacts would be very large – one cannot fill the coasts with large mechanical equipment, and remove a large fraction of all the wave energy in coastal areas around the world, and think that there would not be a staggeringly large impact, it seems to me. I think this is the final nail in the coffin for wave energy on large scales. It may make sense to develop it in local areas where the potential wave energy is particularly high, however, and in any case we don't know enough about the environmental impact to pull the plug on it yet. Just enough to be very pessimistic.
Monday, August 29, 2016
Saturday, August 20, 2016
B.C.'s climate plan: What you need to know
B.C.'s climate plan: What you need to know
The Globe and Mail, 19 August 2016, by James Keller
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/bcs-climate-plan-five-charts-that-explain-thedebate/article31466056/
This article details the latest developments in British Columbia (Canada) regarding the government's efforts to combat climate change. BC adopted a revenue-neutral carbon tax in 2008, and that tax was scheduled to rise annually in order to create increasing pressure for greenhouse gas emissions reductions. In 2012, however, the price was frozen at CAD $30/ton (about US $23/ton), and there it has stood ever since. Perhaps as a result of that, emissions in BC are climbing, and it is now acknowledged that BC will miss its previously set emissions target for 2020. An expert panel formed by the BC government recommended last year that the carbon price be unfrozen again, and that specific greenhouse gas reduction targets be set for 2030 and 2050, so as to make progress on climate change goals. The BC government has just announced their new climate plan, and it implements neither of those suggestions; it calls for the carbon price to remain frozen, and for a weaker emissions target than recommended by the panel (no target at all for 2030, in fact). The new climate plan does include plans to decrease methane leaks, similar to what the U.S. is presently planning, and a number of other measures intended to reduce emissions. Nevertheless, the reaction to the plan in the environmental community has been uniformly negative, with the Sierra Club calling the plan "fraud".
My take: This is deeply, deeply disappointing. The whole world has been watching British Columbia's experiment in carbon pricing, because they are one of a handful of places to institute a broad-based carbon tax rather than a cap-and-trade scheme or taxes only on specific products or activities (such as a gasoline tax). Indeed, the Carbon Tax Center (carbontax.org) calls BC's tax "the most comprehensive and transparent carbon tax in the Western Hemisphere, if not the world". BC has thus been a leading light for the movement. And initially BC's experiment seemed successful; emissions went down, and economic activity did not seem to be harmed – perhaps it even benefited. Nevertheless, their carbon price was frozen for political reasons, and now their emissions are climbing again as the market responds to the shift in incentives. I had hoped that the recent political turnover in Canada, from Harper to Trudeau, would facilitate a renewal of BC's commitment to their carbon tax; but apparently not. Those of us pushing for a meaningful carbon tax in the U.S. and around the world should look closely at BC as an example of how politics can interfere even after a tax is passed; we should devote more thought to the problem of how to safeguard a carbon tax from political interference after passage, I suspect. I've written before about the political difficulties of implementing a carbon tax; see here and here. This article provides a clear case study in these difficulties.
The Globe and Mail, 19 August 2016, by James Keller
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/bcs-climate-plan-five-charts-that-explain-thedebate/article31466056/
This article details the latest developments in British Columbia (Canada) regarding the government's efforts to combat climate change. BC adopted a revenue-neutral carbon tax in 2008, and that tax was scheduled to rise annually in order to create increasing pressure for greenhouse gas emissions reductions. In 2012, however, the price was frozen at CAD $30/ton (about US $23/ton), and there it has stood ever since. Perhaps as a result of that, emissions in BC are climbing, and it is now acknowledged that BC will miss its previously set emissions target for 2020. An expert panel formed by the BC government recommended last year that the carbon price be unfrozen again, and that specific greenhouse gas reduction targets be set for 2030 and 2050, so as to make progress on climate change goals. The BC government has just announced their new climate plan, and it implements neither of those suggestions; it calls for the carbon price to remain frozen, and for a weaker emissions target than recommended by the panel (no target at all for 2030, in fact). The new climate plan does include plans to decrease methane leaks, similar to what the U.S. is presently planning, and a number of other measures intended to reduce emissions. Nevertheless, the reaction to the plan in the environmental community has been uniformly negative, with the Sierra Club calling the plan "fraud".
My take: This is deeply, deeply disappointing. The whole world has been watching British Columbia's experiment in carbon pricing, because they are one of a handful of places to institute a broad-based carbon tax rather than a cap-and-trade scheme or taxes only on specific products or activities (such as a gasoline tax). Indeed, the Carbon Tax Center (carbontax.org) calls BC's tax "the most comprehensive and transparent carbon tax in the Western Hemisphere, if not the world". BC has thus been a leading light for the movement. And initially BC's experiment seemed successful; emissions went down, and economic activity did not seem to be harmed – perhaps it even benefited. Nevertheless, their carbon price was frozen for political reasons, and now their emissions are climbing again as the market responds to the shift in incentives. I had hoped that the recent political turnover in Canada, from Harper to Trudeau, would facilitate a renewal of BC's commitment to their carbon tax; but apparently not. Those of us pushing for a meaningful carbon tax in the U.S. and around the world should look closely at BC as an example of how politics can interfere even after a tax is passed; we should devote more thought to the problem of how to safeguard a carbon tax from political interference after passage, I suspect. I've written before about the political difficulties of implementing a carbon tax; see here and here. This article provides a clear case study in these difficulties.
Sunday, August 14, 2016
How a new source of water is helping reduce conflict in the Middle East
How a new source of water is helping reduce conflict in the Middle East
Ensia, 19 July 2016, by Rowan Jacobsen
http://ensia.com/features/how-a-new-source-of-water-is-helping-reduce-conflict-in-the-middle-east/
"The desalination era is here." A fascinating article that describes how Israel has embraced desalination on a large scale, resulting in a water surplus in the heart of a drought-ridden region (thanks also to aggressive conservation and reuse programs far beyond those in other countries). Technological advances have improved desal's practicality and efficiency greatly, and 55% of Israel's water now comes from desalination. Furthermore, Israel is starting to collaborate with neighboring countries to spread the technology throughout the region. It is often suggested that water shortages due to climate change will cause conflict and war (as seems perhaps to have happened in Syria). But this article suggests that it can also be a goad toward greater co-operation and interdependence that could lead to peace.
My take: Overall this seems like excellent news. If we can use desalination to take the pressure off of our overstressed freshwater sources – many of which are already in decline due to excessive withdrawals and/or climate change – that is all to the good. What worries me about the desalination boom, which this article doesn't really discuss, is that it will substantially increase energy demand, undermining our efforts to get off of fossil fuels. The article says desal is about 1/3 as expensive as it was in the 1990s, and I guess that implies it is also more energy-efficient than it used to be; nevertheless, if countries bigger than Israel start relying on desal on a large scale, it will increase energy demand enormously. If achieving water security in the age of climate change requires a massive buildout of desal plants, that may spell big trouble for our energy policy and our greenhouse emissions. Nevertheless, efficient and practical desalination is a key technological advance needed to get us through the coming century, and it is heartening to hear that progress is being made on it – and that that is leading to co-operation among nations.
Ensia, 19 July 2016, by Rowan Jacobsen
http://ensia.com/features/how-a-new-source-of-water-is-helping-reduce-conflict-in-the-middle-east/
"The desalination era is here." A fascinating article that describes how Israel has embraced desalination on a large scale, resulting in a water surplus in the heart of a drought-ridden region (thanks also to aggressive conservation and reuse programs far beyond those in other countries). Technological advances have improved desal's practicality and efficiency greatly, and 55% of Israel's water now comes from desalination. Furthermore, Israel is starting to collaborate with neighboring countries to spread the technology throughout the region. It is often suggested that water shortages due to climate change will cause conflict and war (as seems perhaps to have happened in Syria). But this article suggests that it can also be a goad toward greater co-operation and interdependence that could lead to peace.
My take: Overall this seems like excellent news. If we can use desalination to take the pressure off of our overstressed freshwater sources – many of which are already in decline due to excessive withdrawals and/or climate change – that is all to the good. What worries me about the desalination boom, which this article doesn't really discuss, is that it will substantially increase energy demand, undermining our efforts to get off of fossil fuels. The article says desal is about 1/3 as expensive as it was in the 1990s, and I guess that implies it is also more energy-efficient than it used to be; nevertheless, if countries bigger than Israel start relying on desal on a large scale, it will increase energy demand enormously. If achieving water security in the age of climate change requires a massive buildout of desal plants, that may spell big trouble for our energy policy and our greenhouse emissions. Nevertheless, efficient and practical desalination is a key technological advance needed to get us through the coming century, and it is heartening to hear that progress is being made on it – and that that is leading to co-operation among nations.
Nuclear subsidies are key part of New York's clean-energy plan
Nuclear subsidies are key part of New York's clean-energy plan
New York Times, 20 July 2016, by Vivian Yee
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/nyregion/nuclear-subsidies-new-york-clean-energy-plan.html
My previous post discussed one angle on the "intermittency problem" posed by solar. This article exposes another angle on the same basic issue. New York plans to get half of its electricity from renewables – mostly solar and wind – by 2030. But if the sun isn't shining and the wind isn't blowing, that means that there will be half as much energy feeding into the grid as when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing. This poses a problem. When the sun is shining, the cost of solar is getting remarkably low – so low that it undercuts other sources of power, rendering them unprofitable. But those other sources of power can't all be shut down; they are needed when the sun is not shining. The need for this "baseline power" that is available at any time means that as solar and wind increase their market share, something must be done to keep the baseline power economically viable. As renewables grow, we can let the dirtiest baseline plants fold – i.e., coal plants. But we can't let them all fold, even though they will all be rendered unprofitable due to the glut of cheap solar power during peak times. In particular, if we close nuclear plants (which are zero-emissions), we will just burn that much more natural gas, or perhaps even revert back to burning coal after all – and then we won't meet our climate goals. New York's response to this situation, as the article details, is apparently to subsidize the nuclear plants to keep them economic, but of course this is politically uncomfortable given the public's dislike of nuclear, as well as Exelon's near-monopoly position on New York's nuclear power. It smells like a corporate giveaway, and the politics of it have been handled poorly by the state, too.
My take: The problem is real. Cheap but intermittent renewables undercut the prices necessary to sustain the baseline power plants that we need, for the foreseeable future, to meet our power needs. Various solutions to this problem have been proposed, from charging solar generators an extra fee (effectively penalizing them for their intermittency), to subsidizing baseline plants so they remain economically viable; none is very satisfying. The most natural solution would be to let the market set prices freely throughout the day; prices near the solar peak would plummet toward zero, whereas prices off-peak would skyrocket (because the baseline plants would have to pay for themselves only by selling power during those off-peak times). This solution is generally seen as so undesirable that it is not seriously considered, since it would render both solar and non-solar plants economically precarious, and would probably raise overall energy costs considerably. So. New York will probably receive a lot of flak for giving money away to Exelon to support nuclear plants that aren't profitable on their own; but it is worth contemplating the reality of the energy market and asking what alternative solution you would actually prefer. If the nuclear plants close, that will be the final nail in the coffin for any hope of New York meeting its climate goals, since they supply about a third of all NY's power. Instead, we simply must find a way for solar and nuclear to "play nice" even though solar undercuts nuclear in cost. As with the problems examined in the previous post, these sorts of issues are why many analysts have trouble imagining intermittent renewables providing more than 50% of our power without major technological advances in batteries or long-distance transmission.
New York Times, 20 July 2016, by Vivian Yee
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/nyregion/nuclear-subsidies-new-york-clean-energy-plan.html
My previous post discussed one angle on the "intermittency problem" posed by solar. This article exposes another angle on the same basic issue. New York plans to get half of its electricity from renewables – mostly solar and wind – by 2030. But if the sun isn't shining and the wind isn't blowing, that means that there will be half as much energy feeding into the grid as when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing. This poses a problem. When the sun is shining, the cost of solar is getting remarkably low – so low that it undercuts other sources of power, rendering them unprofitable. But those other sources of power can't all be shut down; they are needed when the sun is not shining. The need for this "baseline power" that is available at any time means that as solar and wind increase their market share, something must be done to keep the baseline power economically viable. As renewables grow, we can let the dirtiest baseline plants fold – i.e., coal plants. But we can't let them all fold, even though they will all be rendered unprofitable due to the glut of cheap solar power during peak times. In particular, if we close nuclear plants (which are zero-emissions), we will just burn that much more natural gas, or perhaps even revert back to burning coal after all – and then we won't meet our climate goals. New York's response to this situation, as the article details, is apparently to subsidize the nuclear plants to keep them economic, but of course this is politically uncomfortable given the public's dislike of nuclear, as well as Exelon's near-monopoly position on New York's nuclear power. It smells like a corporate giveaway, and the politics of it have been handled poorly by the state, too.
My take: The problem is real. Cheap but intermittent renewables undercut the prices necessary to sustain the baseline power plants that we need, for the foreseeable future, to meet our power needs. Various solutions to this problem have been proposed, from charging solar generators an extra fee (effectively penalizing them for their intermittency), to subsidizing baseline plants so they remain economically viable; none is very satisfying. The most natural solution would be to let the market set prices freely throughout the day; prices near the solar peak would plummet toward zero, whereas prices off-peak would skyrocket (because the baseline plants would have to pay for themselves only by selling power during those off-peak times). This solution is generally seen as so undesirable that it is not seriously considered, since it would render both solar and non-solar plants economically precarious, and would probably raise overall energy costs considerably. So. New York will probably receive a lot of flak for giving money away to Exelon to support nuclear plants that aren't profitable on their own; but it is worth contemplating the reality of the energy market and asking what alternative solution you would actually prefer. If the nuclear plants close, that will be the final nail in the coffin for any hope of New York meeting its climate goals, since they supply about a third of all NY's power. Instead, we simply must find a way for solar and nuclear to "play nice" even though solar undercuts nuclear in cost. As with the problems examined in the previous post, these sorts of issues are why many analysts have trouble imagining intermittent renewables providing more than 50% of our power without major technological advances in batteries or long-distance transmission.
Why home solar panels no longer pay in some states
Why home solar panels no longer pay in some states
New York Times, 26 July 2016, by Diane Cardwell
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/business/energy-environment/why-home-solar-panels-no-longer-pay-in-some-states.html
Energy policy analysts have been pointing out problems looming on the horizon for quite a while now. As solar's share of the energy market increases, various stresses are created that are difficult to cope with. One problem is that you begin to have a glut of energy when the sun is shining strongly, while developing a deficit at other times. This article shows that this "intermittency" problem is beginning to rear its ugly head. Utilities in high-solar-adoption states, such as PG&E in California, are changing their pricing models to charge consumers much more for off-peak power while paying them less for the power their solar panels send in to the grid during peak times. Consumers are discovering that their solar installations are no longer cost-effective and may never pay for themselves as a result. The same dynamics are playing out in Spain and Europe now, and are impacting states from Hawaii to Arizona.
My take: It is important to recognize that this is not the result of greed or backwardness on the part of the utilities; it is a simple consequence of the law of supply and demand. If the utilities did not decrease the price paid at peak solar times, they would be unable to sell all the power generated at those times. Conversely, if they did not raise the price at off-peak times, demand would outstrip the available supply, and brownouts or rolling blackouts would inevitably result. Fixing these issues is not simple. Power could be transported from areas with too much to areas with too little; but since day and night each cover half the globe at any given time, the distances involved are very large and power grids are not nearly up to the task at present (not to mention that large losses due to long-distance transmission would result). Power could be stored in batteries to be taken out later when the sun isn't shining; but the battery capacity needed to get a large region through a long period of overcast skies (much less a single night) is staggeringly large. Both of these options are immensely expensive, and these costs ought to be considered part of the cost of solar power, since it is solar's intermittency that creates the need for them. In short, today's technology gives us no good solution to the intermittency problem in general. This will limit how much market penetration will be possible for solar (and for wind, which has similar intermittency issues). Many analysts predict that about 50% is the maximum we could handle; the rest of our energy simply must come from "baseline" sources that can be turned on whenever they are needed: coal, natural gas, oil, and nuclear. As this reality becomes more clear, we can expect subsidy programs such as generous feed-in tariffs to evaporate, as the article illustrates is already happening in many markets (even though we are still very far from 50% market penetration of renewables). As the article says, "Energy experts predict a bumpy transition." I'll write about another angle on this problem in a future post.
New York Times, 26 July 2016, by Diane Cardwell
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/business/energy-environment/why-home-solar-panels-no-longer-pay-in-some-states.html
Energy policy analysts have been pointing out problems looming on the horizon for quite a while now. As solar's share of the energy market increases, various stresses are created that are difficult to cope with. One problem is that you begin to have a glut of energy when the sun is shining strongly, while developing a deficit at other times. This article shows that this "intermittency" problem is beginning to rear its ugly head. Utilities in high-solar-adoption states, such as PG&E in California, are changing their pricing models to charge consumers much more for off-peak power while paying them less for the power their solar panels send in to the grid during peak times. Consumers are discovering that their solar installations are no longer cost-effective and may never pay for themselves as a result. The same dynamics are playing out in Spain and Europe now, and are impacting states from Hawaii to Arizona.
My take: It is important to recognize that this is not the result of greed or backwardness on the part of the utilities; it is a simple consequence of the law of supply and demand. If the utilities did not decrease the price paid at peak solar times, they would be unable to sell all the power generated at those times. Conversely, if they did not raise the price at off-peak times, demand would outstrip the available supply, and brownouts or rolling blackouts would inevitably result. Fixing these issues is not simple. Power could be transported from areas with too much to areas with too little; but since day and night each cover half the globe at any given time, the distances involved are very large and power grids are not nearly up to the task at present (not to mention that large losses due to long-distance transmission would result). Power could be stored in batteries to be taken out later when the sun isn't shining; but the battery capacity needed to get a large region through a long period of overcast skies (much less a single night) is staggeringly large. Both of these options are immensely expensive, and these costs ought to be considered part of the cost of solar power, since it is solar's intermittency that creates the need for them. In short, today's technology gives us no good solution to the intermittency problem in general. This will limit how much market penetration will be possible for solar (and for wind, which has similar intermittency issues). Many analysts predict that about 50% is the maximum we could handle; the rest of our energy simply must come from "baseline" sources that can be turned on whenever they are needed: coal, natural gas, oil, and nuclear. As this reality becomes more clear, we can expect subsidy programs such as generous feed-in tariffs to evaporate, as the article illustrates is already happening in many markets (even though we are still very far from 50% market penetration of renewables). As the article says, "Energy experts predict a bumpy transition." I'll write about another angle on this problem in a future post.
If carbon pricing is so great, why isn't it working?
If carbon pricing is so great, why isn't it working?
Ensia, 12 July 2016, by Peter Fairley
http://ensia.com/features/if-carbon-pricing-is-so-great-why-isnt-it-working/
Carbon pricing is often touted – by the IMF, by CCL, by me – as the best way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and get climate change under control. Various carbon-pricing schemes are already in effect around the world, from "cap-and-trade" in Europe and the Northeast's RGGI to a carbon tax in British Columbia, and carbon pricing is under consideration in several more countries, including China and Brazil. And yet the carbon-pricing schemes we have seen so far have generally been failures, with prices on carbon so low as to be "virtually valueless" – usually below $15/ton, whereas it is estimated that $44/ton would be needed to achieve the Paris climate goals (as an average global target, I think?). This discrepancy is, the article argues, because "carbon pricing is as politically inexpedient as it is economically efficient". For cap-and-trade, this manifests in many ways: too many allowances allocated, too much acceptance of questionable carbon offsets, too much complexity and hidden exemptions. Carbon taxation schemes avoid most of these pitfalls, and BC's tax of $23/ton has led to some emissions reductions, but the price remains too low, and taxes are more politically difficult to achieve than cap-and-trade schemes. Despite its success, BC's tax is unpopular and has been frozen since 2012; since Canada, with its very high emissions and dirty tar sands oil, is estimated to need a price of $124/ton to meet its ambitious Paris pledges, it is hard not to see the BC scheme, too, as a failure. As a result of this, support is growing for a more regulatory approach to climate change.
My take: I love Ensia. This is a really thoughtful and interesting article that challenged me as a staunch supporter of carbon pricing. I would not say that it actually changed my mind; I see so many serious problems with the regulatory approach to climate change that a carbon tax simply seems non-negotiable to me. As Sherlock Holmes said, when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. This article should give pause to all carbon tax advocates given the serious doubts it raises about the viability of carbon pricing. However, those doubts are only about its political viability. The article raises no objections regarding the effectiveness of carbon taxation when properly implemented; indeed, the tax in BC is acknowledged to have reduced emissions substantially while perhaps even increasing economic growth in the region – until it was gutted. So my belief that a carbon tax is the solution remains undiminished; but my worries about the politics of getting there have increased. CCL's proposed fee-and-dividend scheme would start at a low price that would ratchet upward over time, which I imagine is a nod to political expediency since the necessary price could never pass at the outset. But BC's experience with a very similar scheme sounds a cautionary note: every time the price went up, there was a new round of kvetching, and soon the political pressure to freeze the increases was irresistible, and so the target price was never reached. I don't know what the solution is. Mostly I think our politicians need to be pushed to do what is necessary by a groundswell of public opinion that overwhelms the denialists and the special interests. Which is why I support CCL. But boy, this article depressed me.
Ensia, 12 July 2016, by Peter Fairley
http://ensia.com/features/if-carbon-pricing-is-so-great-why-isnt-it-working/
Carbon pricing is often touted – by the IMF, by CCL, by me – as the best way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and get climate change under control. Various carbon-pricing schemes are already in effect around the world, from "cap-and-trade" in Europe and the Northeast's RGGI to a carbon tax in British Columbia, and carbon pricing is under consideration in several more countries, including China and Brazil. And yet the carbon-pricing schemes we have seen so far have generally been failures, with prices on carbon so low as to be "virtually valueless" – usually below $15/ton, whereas it is estimated that $44/ton would be needed to achieve the Paris climate goals (as an average global target, I think?). This discrepancy is, the article argues, because "carbon pricing is as politically inexpedient as it is economically efficient". For cap-and-trade, this manifests in many ways: too many allowances allocated, too much acceptance of questionable carbon offsets, too much complexity and hidden exemptions. Carbon taxation schemes avoid most of these pitfalls, and BC's tax of $23/ton has led to some emissions reductions, but the price remains too low, and taxes are more politically difficult to achieve than cap-and-trade schemes. Despite its success, BC's tax is unpopular and has been frozen since 2012; since Canada, with its very high emissions and dirty tar sands oil, is estimated to need a price of $124/ton to meet its ambitious Paris pledges, it is hard not to see the BC scheme, too, as a failure. As a result of this, support is growing for a more regulatory approach to climate change.
My take: I love Ensia. This is a really thoughtful and interesting article that challenged me as a staunch supporter of carbon pricing. I would not say that it actually changed my mind; I see so many serious problems with the regulatory approach to climate change that a carbon tax simply seems non-negotiable to me. As Sherlock Holmes said, when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. This article should give pause to all carbon tax advocates given the serious doubts it raises about the viability of carbon pricing. However, those doubts are only about its political viability. The article raises no objections regarding the effectiveness of carbon taxation when properly implemented; indeed, the tax in BC is acknowledged to have reduced emissions substantially while perhaps even increasing economic growth in the region – until it was gutted. So my belief that a carbon tax is the solution remains undiminished; but my worries about the politics of getting there have increased. CCL's proposed fee-and-dividend scheme would start at a low price that would ratchet upward over time, which I imagine is a nod to political expediency since the necessary price could never pass at the outset. But BC's experience with a very similar scheme sounds a cautionary note: every time the price went up, there was a new round of kvetching, and soon the political pressure to freeze the increases was irresistible, and so the target price was never reached. I don't know what the solution is. Mostly I think our politicians need to be pushed to do what is necessary by a groundswell of public opinion that overwhelms the denialists and the special interests. Which is why I support CCL. But boy, this article depressed me.
Future of natural gas hinges on stanching methane leaks
Future of natural gas hinges on stanching methane leaks
New York Times, 11 July 2016, by Clifford Krauss
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/business/energy-environment/future-of-natural-gas-hinges-on-stanching-methane-leaks.html
It probably won't come as news to readers here that methane leaks are a major issue with natural gas. This article discusses how that realization has dawned over the whole industry. As we shift from coal toward natural gas and renewables, the methane emitted as a byproduct of natural gas production and distribution has increased as well; the oil and gas industry may now be the biggest source of methane in the U.S. The short-term climate impact of this leaked methane is huge: equivalent to about 240 coal-fired plants, according to the Environmental Defense Fund. As a result, the EPA is getting more serious (and more rigorous) about measuring methane leaks, the BLM is working on rules to reduce methane leaks on public lands, and federal regulators are getting involved. Methane leaks call into question whether natural gas can play the role of a "bridge" while we wait for renewable energy production to spool up. Some companies are co-operating – reducing their emissions voluntarily, and trying to shape regulations in a way that works for them. Others are stonewalling and protesting that higher regulatory costs will put them out of business and push the country back toward coal. The viability of the natural gas industry, and the future of climate change, hangs in the balance.
My take: This is all true, although it would have been nice to see the NYT talking more about it back when the fracking boom was still young and regulation could have nipped the problem in the bud. And it would be nice to see them talking about it a bit more bluntly even now. For example, they fail to mention that the EPA has recently admitted that all of its methane leak estimates have been much too low in the past, and should all be revised upwards drastically; that is a major scandal that is strangely omitted from the article. Similarly, they fail to mention the huge methane leak in California recently – the largest in U.S. history! – which was a major embarrassment for the industry that called into question, for many, whether we will ever be able to trust the industry to act responsibly. The article also says that although an industry group aspires to hold leaks to 1% of total natural gas production, "some estimates put the current amount at nearly twice that level or more"; while that is literally true, since "twice that level or more" is open-ended, it fails to really convey two uncomfortable facts. One, our data collection on methane leakage has been so abysmally bad that nobody really has any precise idea how much is leaked, and credible estimates vary by nearly an order of magnitude; and two, some credible estimates put the leakage rate much higher than "nearly" 2%, with the IPCC, I believe, stating a median consensus of 2-3% (but again, nobody really has good enough data to know). All in all, then, this article strikes me as a softball. I personally think methane leakage is a manageable problem with better regulation (although I'm opposed to natural gas as a bridge fuel for other reasons); but we won't get that better regulation if we fail to take the issue seriously and fully acknowledge how badly we've handled it thus far.
New York Times, 11 July 2016, by Clifford Krauss
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/business/energy-environment/future-of-natural-gas-hinges-on-stanching-methane-leaks.html
It probably won't come as news to readers here that methane leaks are a major issue with natural gas. This article discusses how that realization has dawned over the whole industry. As we shift from coal toward natural gas and renewables, the methane emitted as a byproduct of natural gas production and distribution has increased as well; the oil and gas industry may now be the biggest source of methane in the U.S. The short-term climate impact of this leaked methane is huge: equivalent to about 240 coal-fired plants, according to the Environmental Defense Fund. As a result, the EPA is getting more serious (and more rigorous) about measuring methane leaks, the BLM is working on rules to reduce methane leaks on public lands, and federal regulators are getting involved. Methane leaks call into question whether natural gas can play the role of a "bridge" while we wait for renewable energy production to spool up. Some companies are co-operating – reducing their emissions voluntarily, and trying to shape regulations in a way that works for them. Others are stonewalling and protesting that higher regulatory costs will put them out of business and push the country back toward coal. The viability of the natural gas industry, and the future of climate change, hangs in the balance.
My take: This is all true, although it would have been nice to see the NYT talking more about it back when the fracking boom was still young and regulation could have nipped the problem in the bud. And it would be nice to see them talking about it a bit more bluntly even now. For example, they fail to mention that the EPA has recently admitted that all of its methane leak estimates have been much too low in the past, and should all be revised upwards drastically; that is a major scandal that is strangely omitted from the article. Similarly, they fail to mention the huge methane leak in California recently – the largest in U.S. history! – which was a major embarrassment for the industry that called into question, for many, whether we will ever be able to trust the industry to act responsibly. The article also says that although an industry group aspires to hold leaks to 1% of total natural gas production, "some estimates put the current amount at nearly twice that level or more"; while that is literally true, since "twice that level or more" is open-ended, it fails to really convey two uncomfortable facts. One, our data collection on methane leakage has been so abysmally bad that nobody really has any precise idea how much is leaked, and credible estimates vary by nearly an order of magnitude; and two, some credible estimates put the leakage rate much higher than "nearly" 2%, with the IPCC, I believe, stating a median consensus of 2-3% (but again, nobody really has good enough data to know). All in all, then, this article strikes me as a softball. I personally think methane leakage is a manageable problem with better regulation (although I'm opposed to natural gas as a bridge fuel for other reasons); but we won't get that better regulation if we fail to take the issue seriously and fully acknowledge how badly we've handled it thus far.
Another inconvenient truth: It's hard to agree how to fight climate change
Another inconvenient truth: It's hard to agree how to fight climate change
New York Times, 11 July 2016, by John Schwartz
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/science/climate-change-movement.html
As realization of the importance and urgency of climate change has spread, the environmental movement has splintered, as this article details. Being an environmentalist used to be simple: oppose pollution, support natural reserves, protect endangered species, hug trees. Now it's complicated. Should you be for nuclear power or against it? On the one hand, it's carbon-neutral and non-polluting (apart from that pesky nuclear waste); on the other hand, it entails risks that are frightening and hard to quantify, and is linked to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Similarly: is natural gas a good thing, at least as a "bridge", because it has a much lower carbon footprint than coal – or is it a bad thing, because it just puts off the necessary shift to carbon-neutral energy technologies (not to mention problems with methane leaks, aquifer pollution, and earthquakes)? Should we attack fossil fuel companies, divest from them, and essentially try to shut them down, or should we engage with them and try to shift them toward greener, more responsible policies through actions such as shareholder activism? Will effective action on climate change necessitate the dismantling of capitalism and a reversion of humanity to a simpler and more sustainable way of life, or is capitalism a necessary part of the solution because it provides us with price mechanisms and institutions we can manipulate to incentivize change? The debate on these difficult questions has become sharply polarized, and name-calling has become common. At the same time, the movement is becoming broader, with greater participation from conservatives, Republicans, religious groups, and corporations, leading to an even wider range of opinions and ideas. There's a lot to sort out, and it's hard to know which claims are evidence-based and which are propaganda. The article ends with quotes from Al Gore to the effect that such schisms in growing movements are typical and natural, and that perhaps these debates will soon settled by economics: the plunging cost of renewables will make debates over nuclear, natural gas, etc., irrelevant as solar and wind take over the energy market.
My take: The article makes no attempt to adjudicate these various debates – probably wise, since they are all very difficult questions with no easy answers. But the glaring hole in the article is that it barely mentions the concept of putting a price on carbon; it comes up only as an example of the nasty infighting between different environmentalists, as a battleground between the anti-capitalists like Naomi Klein and the pro-capitalists like Bill McKibben (although I'm not sure he would embrace quite that label). I wish I shared Al Gore's optimism that low prices for renewables will solve all our problems and make all these debates irrelevant; but I don't think it's that simple. We will need more than solar and wind to solve climate change (as I will look at a bit in some reviews coming up soon in my queue), and we will need a price on carbon to do it, too, I think; so the article's failure to really engage with that as one of the core debates in environmentalism today is disappointing to say the least. In the end, this is a pretty empty piece; it's not long enough to really get into the meat of any of the questions it raises, and its implicit endorsement of Gore's opinion that the debates are unimportant because solar and wind are about to solve everything is a simplistic cop-out. In fact, these debates are crucially important; we need to get all of these questions right or we will probably fail to avoid catastrophic climate change. The vitriol and partisanship may be unpleasant, but I'll take unpleasant, vitriolic debate any day over the past several decades of the media failing to delve any deeper into all this than "Is climate change real or not? Let's give equal time to both sides." The fact that we are arguing publicly now about details – science and evidence and policy and models and risk assessment and economics – that fact represents progress, and it gives me hope.
New York Times, 11 July 2016, by John Schwartz
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/science/climate-change-movement.html
As realization of the importance and urgency of climate change has spread, the environmental movement has splintered, as this article details. Being an environmentalist used to be simple: oppose pollution, support natural reserves, protect endangered species, hug trees. Now it's complicated. Should you be for nuclear power or against it? On the one hand, it's carbon-neutral and non-polluting (apart from that pesky nuclear waste); on the other hand, it entails risks that are frightening and hard to quantify, and is linked to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Similarly: is natural gas a good thing, at least as a "bridge", because it has a much lower carbon footprint than coal – or is it a bad thing, because it just puts off the necessary shift to carbon-neutral energy technologies (not to mention problems with methane leaks, aquifer pollution, and earthquakes)? Should we attack fossil fuel companies, divest from them, and essentially try to shut them down, or should we engage with them and try to shift them toward greener, more responsible policies through actions such as shareholder activism? Will effective action on climate change necessitate the dismantling of capitalism and a reversion of humanity to a simpler and more sustainable way of life, or is capitalism a necessary part of the solution because it provides us with price mechanisms and institutions we can manipulate to incentivize change? The debate on these difficult questions has become sharply polarized, and name-calling has become common. At the same time, the movement is becoming broader, with greater participation from conservatives, Republicans, religious groups, and corporations, leading to an even wider range of opinions and ideas. There's a lot to sort out, and it's hard to know which claims are evidence-based and which are propaganda. The article ends with quotes from Al Gore to the effect that such schisms in growing movements are typical and natural, and that perhaps these debates will soon settled by economics: the plunging cost of renewables will make debates over nuclear, natural gas, etc., irrelevant as solar and wind take over the energy market.
My take: The article makes no attempt to adjudicate these various debates – probably wise, since they are all very difficult questions with no easy answers. But the glaring hole in the article is that it barely mentions the concept of putting a price on carbon; it comes up only as an example of the nasty infighting between different environmentalists, as a battleground between the anti-capitalists like Naomi Klein and the pro-capitalists like Bill McKibben (although I'm not sure he would embrace quite that label). I wish I shared Al Gore's optimism that low prices for renewables will solve all our problems and make all these debates irrelevant; but I don't think it's that simple. We will need more than solar and wind to solve climate change (as I will look at a bit in some reviews coming up soon in my queue), and we will need a price on carbon to do it, too, I think; so the article's failure to really engage with that as one of the core debates in environmentalism today is disappointing to say the least. In the end, this is a pretty empty piece; it's not long enough to really get into the meat of any of the questions it raises, and its implicit endorsement of Gore's opinion that the debates are unimportant because solar and wind are about to solve everything is a simplistic cop-out. In fact, these debates are crucially important; we need to get all of these questions right or we will probably fail to avoid catastrophic climate change. The vitriol and partisanship may be unpleasant, but I'll take unpleasant, vitriolic debate any day over the past several decades of the media failing to delve any deeper into all this than "Is climate change real or not? Let's give equal time to both sides." The fact that we are arguing publicly now about details – science and evidence and policy and models and risk assessment and economics – that fact represents progress, and it gives me hope.
Exxon touts carbon tax to oil industry
Exxon touts carbon tax to oil industry
Wall St. Journal, 30 June 2016, by Amy Harder and Bradley Olson
http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-touts-carbon-tax-to-oil-industry-1467279004
This article (paywalled, unfortunately, but the WSJ has limited free access for 24 hours) discusses a recent shift in Exxon's public stance on climate change, from tacit support for a revenue-neutral carbon tax (since in their view other climate policy actions would be even worse) to actual public advocacy of such a tax, both on Capital Hill and in trade associations. The article notes that Exxon is under strong pressure to show more positive action regarding climate change, since it is under investigation for conspiring to cover up scientific research related to climate change. It also mentions that Exxon has a financial motive for supporting a carbon tax, since such a tax would hurt coal even more than oil and natural gas. In any case, with this shift Exxon joins European energy companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and BP that have been advocating for a price on carbon for some years, whereas other U.S. energy companies, such as Chevron, continue to publicly oppose a carbon tax.
My take: As the article notes (and it is nice to see this sort of balanced coverage in the WSJ), this shift actually serves Exxon's interests in various ways; it is not likely that Exxon has suddenly decided to value the fate of humanity over its own bottom line. However, I think this angle could be taken considerably further. The Union of Concerned Scientists has been fighting Exxon tooth and nail, as detailed on their blog (http://blog.ucsusa.org/tag/exxonclimatescandal), and Exxon has by no means given up the fight. At the same time that Exxon is talking a good game regarding carbon taxation, it continues to fund misinformation on climate change and to deny its past coverups of climate science (http://blog.ucsusa.org/gretchen-goldman/as-congress-calls-out-fossil-fuel-deception-exxonmobil-continues-to-fund-climate-science-denial). So it is difficult to see these shifts and maneuvers by Exxon as anything but self-interested greenwashing.
Wall St. Journal, 30 June 2016, by Amy Harder and Bradley Olson
http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-touts-carbon-tax-to-oil-industry-1467279004
This article (paywalled, unfortunately, but the WSJ has limited free access for 24 hours) discusses a recent shift in Exxon's public stance on climate change, from tacit support for a revenue-neutral carbon tax (since in their view other climate policy actions would be even worse) to actual public advocacy of such a tax, both on Capital Hill and in trade associations. The article notes that Exxon is under strong pressure to show more positive action regarding climate change, since it is under investigation for conspiring to cover up scientific research related to climate change. It also mentions that Exxon has a financial motive for supporting a carbon tax, since such a tax would hurt coal even more than oil and natural gas. In any case, with this shift Exxon joins European energy companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and BP that have been advocating for a price on carbon for some years, whereas other U.S. energy companies, such as Chevron, continue to publicly oppose a carbon tax.
My take: As the article notes (and it is nice to see this sort of balanced coverage in the WSJ), this shift actually serves Exxon's interests in various ways; it is not likely that Exxon has suddenly decided to value the fate of humanity over its own bottom line. However, I think this angle could be taken considerably further. The Union of Concerned Scientists has been fighting Exxon tooth and nail, as detailed on their blog (http://blog.ucsusa.org/tag/exxonclimatescandal), and Exxon has by no means given up the fight. At the same time that Exxon is talking a good game regarding carbon taxation, it continues to fund misinformation on climate change and to deny its past coverups of climate science (http://blog.ucsusa.org/gretchen-goldman/as-congress-calls-out-fossil-fuel-deception-exxonmobil-continues-to-fund-climate-science-denial). So it is difficult to see these shifts and maneuvers by Exxon as anything but self-interested greenwashing.
Last week's Democratic platform vote was a win for carbon taxes
Last week's Democratic platform vote was a win for carbon taxes
Carbon Tax Center, 29 July 2016, by Charles Komanoff
http://www.carbontax.org/blog/2016/06/29/last-weeks-democratic-platform-vote-was-a-win-for-carbon-taxes/
This missive from the glass-is-half-full camp claims that the Democratic Party's failure to adopt carbon taxation as a plank in its platform should actually be seen as a "win". The plank, proposed and drafted by activist Bill McKibben of 350.org, stated that CO2 and other greenhouse gases should be taxed at "a rate high enough" to allow the Paris 2015 climate goals to be reached. Although the plank was voted down, the article sees this as a positive development overall because (1) it got discussed by the party at all, (2) it lost by only a 7-6 vote, and (3) it was explicitly about a carbon tax, rather than just the more vague "price on carbon" that leaves the door open for carbon cap-and-trade schemes that the author feels are undesirable. All these things show that the idea of carbon taxation is entering the political mainstream.
My take: I actually agree with the article that it is surprising and heartening to see carbon taxation being taken so seriously by politicians. This is an unprecedented development, and we can certainly hope that it is a harbinger of things to come. However, since I am more of the glass-is-half-empty persuasion, let me just note a few contrary points. One, getting "fringe" ideas into a party platform is much easier than getting politicians to actually take action on those ideas. The party platform is, in the end, just talk; it's an opportunity for politicians to talk a good game without having to actually write legislation, make difficult votes, or buck big-money donors. Two, the plank, while well-meant, is rather strategically vague in its call for "a rate high enough" to achieve climate goals, with no hint as to what that rate might be – doubtless because the tax rate that would actually be necessary would be uncomfortably high, which even in the anodyne setting of the party platform would make it difficult for politicians to sign on. And three, if we can't get it into the platform even in this "perfect storm" election year, with record-breaking temperatures spurred by El Niño plus the Bernie surge and his pressure on the platform process, what hope do we have to pass it later – especially since Clinton's camp opposed this plank, as McKibben has described? But OK; I apologize for raining on the parade.
Carbon Tax Center, 29 July 2016, by Charles Komanoff
http://www.carbontax.org/blog/2016/06/29/last-weeks-democratic-platform-vote-was-a-win-for-carbon-taxes/
This missive from the glass-is-half-full camp claims that the Democratic Party's failure to adopt carbon taxation as a plank in its platform should actually be seen as a "win". The plank, proposed and drafted by activist Bill McKibben of 350.org, stated that CO2 and other greenhouse gases should be taxed at "a rate high enough" to allow the Paris 2015 climate goals to be reached. Although the plank was voted down, the article sees this as a positive development overall because (1) it got discussed by the party at all, (2) it lost by only a 7-6 vote, and (3) it was explicitly about a carbon tax, rather than just the more vague "price on carbon" that leaves the door open for carbon cap-and-trade schemes that the author feels are undesirable. All these things show that the idea of carbon taxation is entering the political mainstream.
My take: I actually agree with the article that it is surprising and heartening to see carbon taxation being taken so seriously by politicians. This is an unprecedented development, and we can certainly hope that it is a harbinger of things to come. However, since I am more of the glass-is-half-empty persuasion, let me just note a few contrary points. One, getting "fringe" ideas into a party platform is much easier than getting politicians to actually take action on those ideas. The party platform is, in the end, just talk; it's an opportunity for politicians to talk a good game without having to actually write legislation, make difficult votes, or buck big-money donors. Two, the plank, while well-meant, is rather strategically vague in its call for "a rate high enough" to achieve climate goals, with no hint as to what that rate might be – doubtless because the tax rate that would actually be necessary would be uncomfortably high, which even in the anodyne setting of the party platform would make it difficult for politicians to sign on. And three, if we can't get it into the platform even in this "perfect storm" election year, with record-breaking temperatures spurred by El Niño plus the Bernie surge and his pressure on the platform process, what hope do we have to pass it later – especially since Clinton's camp opposed this plank, as McKibben has described? But OK; I apologize for raining on the parade.
Canadian company turns air into fuel in climate change fight
Canadian company turns air into fuel in climate change fight
Huffington Post, 5 July 2016, by Dominique Mosbergen
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/carbon-capture-fuel_us_577a177ae4b0a629c1aa7669
Continuing in the vein of my recent posts about carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), this article discusses current efforts to capture CO2 directly out of the air, often called "direct air capture". This technology could be used to pressurize CO2 and store it underground (thereby taking it out of the atmosphere permanently, assuming it doesn't leak back out), or it could be used to turn the CO2 into fuel that can then be burned (a carbon-neutral process, in theory, since all the CO2 released by burning the fuel was originally captured from the air). In particular, the article touts a firm called Carbon Engineering that is taking the second approach. Carbon Engineering claims that it can capture CO2 for about $100/ton in its process, which involves splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen, then combining the hydrogen with CO2 to produce fuel that they will ultimately sell at a profit for "about $4 to $6 a gallon". They claim that their process is scalable and could play a major role in combating climate change. They have the backing of Bill Gates and some other deep-pocketed individuals, and are presently building a pilot plant that they say will produce about 1000 barrels of fuel per day, while removing 100,000 tons of CO2 from the atmosphere each year (equivalent to the carbon footprint of about 25,000 vehicles, they say).
My take: Color me skeptical. Direct air capture has been discussed for decades, but it has always been way, way too expensive to be cost-effective, and nothing in this article convinces me that Carbon Engineering has cracked that problem. Even capturing CO2 directly from the emissions streams of coal and gas plants, where the CO2 is extremely concentrated, is very difficult to do efficiently and cost-effectively (as shown by the failure of the Kemper plant that I discussed in my previous post). Capturing CO2 from the atmosphere, where its concentration is only about 0.04%, is much more difficult still. The fact that Gates is putting his money behind this tempers my skepticism somewhat – Gates is a smart man, whatever one might think of him – but since the article provides no technical details whatsoever regarding how Carbon Engineering has managed to cut the cost of direct air capture by an order of magnitude compared to previous attempts... well, I'm not betting on this technology being successful. I would also note that at $4-$6 per gallon and $100/ton CO2, even if their technology works they will have trouble selling it unless governments put a high price on carbon emissions. A carbon fee-and-dividend scheme would allow projects like this to be economically viable – if the technology actually works, that is.
Huffington Post, 5 July 2016, by Dominique Mosbergen
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/carbon-capture-fuel_us_577a177ae4b0a629c1aa7669
Continuing in the vein of my recent posts about carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), this article discusses current efforts to capture CO2 directly out of the air, often called "direct air capture". This technology could be used to pressurize CO2 and store it underground (thereby taking it out of the atmosphere permanently, assuming it doesn't leak back out), or it could be used to turn the CO2 into fuel that can then be burned (a carbon-neutral process, in theory, since all the CO2 released by burning the fuel was originally captured from the air). In particular, the article touts a firm called Carbon Engineering that is taking the second approach. Carbon Engineering claims that it can capture CO2 for about $100/ton in its process, which involves splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen, then combining the hydrogen with CO2 to produce fuel that they will ultimately sell at a profit for "about $4 to $6 a gallon". They claim that their process is scalable and could play a major role in combating climate change. They have the backing of Bill Gates and some other deep-pocketed individuals, and are presently building a pilot plant that they say will produce about 1000 barrels of fuel per day, while removing 100,000 tons of CO2 from the atmosphere each year (equivalent to the carbon footprint of about 25,000 vehicles, they say).
My take: Color me skeptical. Direct air capture has been discussed for decades, but it has always been way, way too expensive to be cost-effective, and nothing in this article convinces me that Carbon Engineering has cracked that problem. Even capturing CO2 directly from the emissions streams of coal and gas plants, where the CO2 is extremely concentrated, is very difficult to do efficiently and cost-effectively (as shown by the failure of the Kemper plant that I discussed in my previous post). Capturing CO2 from the atmosphere, where its concentration is only about 0.04%, is much more difficult still. The fact that Gates is putting his money behind this tempers my skepticism somewhat – Gates is a smart man, whatever one might think of him – but since the article provides no technical details whatsoever regarding how Carbon Engineering has managed to cut the cost of direct air capture by an order of magnitude compared to previous attempts... well, I'm not betting on this technology being successful. I would also note that at $4-$6 per gallon and $100/ton CO2, even if their technology works they will have trouble selling it unless governments put a high price on carbon emissions. A carbon fee-and-dividend scheme would allow projects like this to be economically viable – if the technology actually works, that is.
Piles of dirty secrets behind a model "clean coal" project
Piles of dirty secrets behind a model "clean coal" project
New York Times, 5 July 2016, by Ian Urbina
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/science/kemper-coal-mississippi.html
This is a sad story of failure and fraud at the frontiers of clean energy research: the Kemper "clean coal" plant in Mississippi. The Kemper plant was supposed to capture the CO2 emitted from the combustion of coal, preventing its release into the atmosphere. The captured CO2 would then be pressurized, piped to oilfields, and pumped underground to facilitate the extraction of oil while simultaneously sequestering the CO2 underground (permanently, it is hoped). The plant was the U.S.'s big exploratory investment in this technology, called "carbon capture and sequestration" (CCS), and has been talked about as a "central piece" of Obama's plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, the plant is now more than $4 billion over budget, two years behind schedule, and is being sued for fraud by ratepayers and investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission – and all this before it has even started operations. The Times has done some good investigative journalism here, detailing the saga in all its sordidness, including reviews of extensive documents provided by a whistleblower and interviews with many people on all sides of the situation. There is plenty of blame to be shared: corporate executives, government officials, and regulators all had a hand in mismanaging the plant and covering up the problems. Meanwhile, work on the plant continues, and ratepayers and taxpayers continue to foot the bill.
My take: This article serves as a counterpoint to the previous article I reviewed, on a carbon sequestration project in Iceland that appears to be wildly successful. This article illustrates the flip side of that: carbon sequestration is hard, most of our attempts at it have failed, it remains very expensive, and although the benefits of success in this arena would be immense (and thus we ought to keep trying), we cannot afford to assume that we will succeed. "Clean coal" has been a favorite mantra of the Obama administration, since it provides the possibility to have our cake and eat it too by being able to continue burning fossil fuels while avoiding the climate impact of the resulting CO2. But the failure of the Kemper plant underlines the unresolved problems with this technology, and the importance of developing alternatives for baseline power. This article also illustrates for me why having the government "pick winners" in energy and climate policy is dangerous. The amounts of money involved, and the political pressures at work, are staggeringly large, and so when a "winner" is picked by the government, the result is often – as with Kemper – regulatory capture, mismanagement, coverups, and ultimately bailouts. A carbon fee-and-divided scheme avoids these problems by changing the incentive structure (by incorporating the negative externalities of CO2 emissions into the price structure) and then allowing free market competition to arrive at the winners, whatever technologies they might be. Lots of important lessons to be learned here.
New York Times, 5 July 2016, by Ian Urbina
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/science/kemper-coal-mississippi.html
This is a sad story of failure and fraud at the frontiers of clean energy research: the Kemper "clean coal" plant in Mississippi. The Kemper plant was supposed to capture the CO2 emitted from the combustion of coal, preventing its release into the atmosphere. The captured CO2 would then be pressurized, piped to oilfields, and pumped underground to facilitate the extraction of oil while simultaneously sequestering the CO2 underground (permanently, it is hoped). The plant was the U.S.'s big exploratory investment in this technology, called "carbon capture and sequestration" (CCS), and has been talked about as a "central piece" of Obama's plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, the plant is now more than $4 billion over budget, two years behind schedule, and is being sued for fraud by ratepayers and investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission – and all this before it has even started operations. The Times has done some good investigative journalism here, detailing the saga in all its sordidness, including reviews of extensive documents provided by a whistleblower and interviews with many people on all sides of the situation. There is plenty of blame to be shared: corporate executives, government officials, and regulators all had a hand in mismanaging the plant and covering up the problems. Meanwhile, work on the plant continues, and ratepayers and taxpayers continue to foot the bill.
My take: This article serves as a counterpoint to the previous article I reviewed, on a carbon sequestration project in Iceland that appears to be wildly successful. This article illustrates the flip side of that: carbon sequestration is hard, most of our attempts at it have failed, it remains very expensive, and although the benefits of success in this arena would be immense (and thus we ought to keep trying), we cannot afford to assume that we will succeed. "Clean coal" has been a favorite mantra of the Obama administration, since it provides the possibility to have our cake and eat it too by being able to continue burning fossil fuels while avoiding the climate impact of the resulting CO2. But the failure of the Kemper plant underlines the unresolved problems with this technology, and the importance of developing alternatives for baseline power. This article also illustrates for me why having the government "pick winners" in energy and climate policy is dangerous. The amounts of money involved, and the political pressures at work, are staggeringly large, and so when a "winner" is picked by the government, the result is often – as with Kemper – regulatory capture, mismanagement, coverups, and ultimately bailouts. A carbon fee-and-divided scheme avoids these problems by changing the incentive structure (by incorporating the negative externalities of CO2 emissions into the price structure) and then allowing free market competition to arrive at the winners, whatever technologies they might be. Lots of important lessons to be learned here.
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